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Helen A. Gartent
Following the publication of my article Banking On the Market: Rely-
ing On Depositors to Control Bank Risks,' I expected an immediate re-
joinder from proponents of market discipline. Concern over the increased
rate of bank failure and the inadequacy of the deposit insurance funds, as
well as pressure for deregulation, were providing impetus for revival of
the notion that the market for deposits could play a greater role in con-
trolling bank risk.2 Yet no such reaction has taken place. Rather than
moving to limit depositors' recovery in failing banks, the bank regulators
have continued to arrange solutions that guarantee protection to all depos-
itors.' Moreover, bank runs by fearful depositors have continued to
occur.
4
Nevertheless, the case for depositor discipline has now been made in an
article by Jonathan R. Macey and Elizabeth H. Garrett.5 Having been
asked to respond, I welcome the opportunity to comment on these authors'
suggestions as well as to note certain developments in the market for de-
posits that seem to me to make the chance of success for depositor disci-
pline even more unlikely. My points may be summarized briefly. First,
since a significant portion of uninsured deposits are maintained for rea-
sons that have little to do with the risk and return associated with invest-
ments in particular banks, the majority of even uninsured depositors will
not continuously monitor bank risk. Second, the structure of the deposit
t Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law at Newark.
1. Garten, Banking On the Market: Relying On Depositors to Control Bank Risks, 4 YALE J. ON
R;. 129 (1986).
2. Ideally, depositors would discipline banks that are engaged in excessive risk-taking by demand-
ing higher returns, or risk premiums, on their deposits or by refusing to invest at all, forcing bank
management to reduce risk-taking in order to attract funds. The idea of depositor discipline is not
new. See, e.g., Tussing, The Case for Bank Failure, 10 J.L. & EcoN. 129 (1967). Nevertheless,
recent interest in regulatory reform has led to fresh consideration of depositor discipline as an alterna-
tive to traditional regulatory handling of bank failure. See, e.g., FEDERAL. DEPosIT INS. CORP., DE-
POSIT INSURANCE IN A CHANGIN; ENVIRONMENT 111-1 (April 15, 1983) [hereinafter DEPIOSIr IN-
SURANCE IN A CHAN(;IN; ENVIRONMENT].
3. See FDIC Agrees to Assistance Plan for Texas BHC Subsidiary Banks, [Current] Fed. Bank-
ing L. Rep. (CCH) 87,067 (Sept. 9, 1987) (FDIC assistance to First City Bancorporation of Texas
to enable its subsidiary banks to remain open).
4. See, e.g., Depositor Run Speeds Closing, Am. Banker, Sept. 15, 1987, at 6, col. I (run on
Minnesota bank following newspaper story about alleged check-kiting scheme).
5. Macey & Garrett, Market Discipline by Depositors: A Summary of the Theoretical and Empir-
ical Arguments, 5 YALE J. ON REt;. 215 (1988).
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market provides strong incentives for all depositors to rely on the liquidity
of their deposits, rather than analysis of bank disclosure, to protect them-
selves against risk. Third, for the same reasons, depositors as a group are
unlikely to develop effective contractual mechanisms that will limit the
inclination of bank management to take excessive risks. Finally, empirical
studies of depositor behavior not only have failed to demonstrate that de-
positors will exert effective market discipline, but cannot explain why
market discipline is not already working to constrain bank risk-taking. I
conclude by offering some comments on the apparent coaflict between effi-
ciency and maintenance of public confidence as the proper goal of bank
failure policy.
I. Depositors and Bank Risk
Initially, I note that in a number of areas, the views of Macey and
Garrett as to the efficacy of depositor discipline are not so very different
from my own. For example, we agree that depositors with accounts under
$100,000, which are currently protected in full by deposit insurance, can
never be expected to monitor and react to increases in bank risk.6 These
depositors therefore will not exert meaningful market discipline on their
banks.
Yet it is also apparent that a significant group of large depositors whose
accounts are not fully insured are equally poor monitors of bank risk.
Such depositors usually hold demand deposits that do not pay interest, so,
as a practical matter, they cannot discipline riskier banks by demanding a
higher return on their investments. More fundamentally, such depositors
typically have chosen their banking relationships for reasons such as con-
venience or the availability of other services that have very little to do with
risk.' Since risk reduction is a less important consideration in choosing a
bank than these other factors, these depositors simply will not respond to
increased risk in the way proponents of market discipline would hope.
As an example of such a depositor, I chose the payroll depositor. The
typical payroll account is a transaction account that is not maintained to
earn a return. Employers instead tend to choose their banks on the basis
of the package of payroll services the bank can offer them. Frequently, an
employer may actually be required to keep compensating balances in the
6. Id. at 217 n.8.
7. I called these depositors "involuntary depositors" to distinguish them from the ideal investor for
whom risk and return are the most important considerations in choosing a bank. Garten, supra note
1, at 134. Of course, involuntary depositors are not forced to keep their funds in a bank that is failing.
Nevertheless, risk reduction is an economic good that can only be purchased at a certain cost. If the
depositor must buy other goods, such as a package of banking services, that depositor simply may be
unable to afford to pay for risk avoidance as well.
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bank to offset its loans. Finally, employers may not always be able to
control balances in their payroll accounts on a daily basis. For these rea-
sons, even some proponents of increased market discipline have suggested
that payroll deposits of any size should be protected from losses by deposit
insurance.8 The motivation is not simply to protect these depositors from
risk, but to prevent the destabilizing effects of these depositors'
"discipline."
Of course, even payroll depositors are not blind to the danger that they
may lose their money if their bank fails. Put another way, at some point
the risk of loss may become so great that it will outweigh other considera-
tions that affect these depositors' choices of banks and they will withdraw
their funds. Nevertheless, as I discussed at length in my article, the reac-
tion of these depositors tends to be sudden, severe, and occasionally irra-
tional, in response to the thinnest of rumors.9 Since these depositors do not
spend the time or money necessary for careful monitoring of bank finan-
cial condition, their discipline is hardly likely to be accurate.
II. Consequences of Depositor Discipline
I also agree with proponents of market discipline that some sophisti-
cated depositors theoretically have the ability, the inclination and the in-
formation necessary to assess bank risk. Nevertheless, depositors' sensitiv-
ity to bank risk does not automatically produce effective discipline on
bank risk-taking. Two important realities about the deposit market may
prevent market discipline from ever working in practice. First, it is simply
cheaper for depositors to withdraw their funds from a bank at the first
sign of trouble than to expend energy or cash to monitor bank risk.
Changing banks may not be costless, but what matters is the relative ex-
pense of withdrawing and reinvesting funds compared with the cost of
monitoring financial condition. The fact that deposits can be liquidated
and redeposited elsewhere virtually without cost is one of the most attrac-
tive features of the deposit instrument as an investment.1l Second, deposi-
tors are extremely concerned about what I have called liquidation risk: the
8. See DEPOSIT INSURANCE IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT, supra note 2, at F-1; see also Tus-
sing, supra note 2, at 147 (proposing increase in deposit insurance ceiling to $1,000,000).
9. Garten, supra note 1, at 136-37. Moreover, the continued occurrence of bank runs suggests
that these depositors apparently are not reassured by the complaint frequently voiced by proponents of
market discipline, that when banks fail, even uninsured depositors usually are protected in full.
10. Macey and Garrett suggest that it may be costly for a depositor to search for alternative
investments. Macey & Garrett, supra note 5, at 230. This is surprising, in light of the ease with
which deposits can be made: banks are always ready and able to accept new funds. Thus, depositors
have a wide variety of choices. More important, the very availability of these options makes individual
bank risk, particularly long-term risk, less significant to the depositor. Rather than trying to assess a
bank's chance of failure over the next six months or six years, depositors can rely on their ability to
move their funds virtually costlessly should the possibility of failure become a probability.
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risk that, in the event their bank runs into trouble, the regulators will
choose to liquidate the bank rather than arranging for a merger or other
solution that will preserve the ability of large depositors quickly to liqui-
date and transfer their funds. 1 Since this important component of bank
risk remains unpredictable, depositors cannot accurately evaluate the risks
associated with investments in different banks.
Recent developments convince me that these realities about the deposit
market are truer than ever. Technological advances have increased the
ability of large depositors to liquidate quickly and transfer their funds
among many different short-term investments. Although information
about banks also has become more widely available and comprehensive,
sophisticated depositors in search of the best rates simply may not have
time to evaluate increasingly complex disclosure concerning bank risk.
This may be a problem particularly for foreign investors, who must act on
the basis of summarized versions of lengthy bank disclosures that are re-
sponsive to bank accounting principles and regulatory standards that may
be completely unfamiliar to them.
At the same time, improved disclosure undoubtedly has awakened for-
merly complacent depositors to the presence of serious risk at almost every
bank. Prior to the liquidation of Penn Square Bank in 1982, the stellar
record of the regulators in insuring that both insured and uninsured de-
positors in failed banks recovered almost all of their investments 2 may
have caused depositors to believe that investments in all banks were rea-
sonably safe. Subsequent near failures and rescues of giant banks such as
Continental Illinois may have reassured some few depositors that the reg-
ulators are committed to protecting all depositors in large banks,' 3 but it is
more likely that these rescues have made all depositors aware that even
the largest banks are not immune to financial difficulties. Thus, the in-
creasing ease with which deposits can be withdrawn and reinvested, plus
the growing public awareness of bank risk generally, may lead large de-
positors simply to switch banks more frequently rather than to choose
banks more carefully. 1
11. See Garten, supra note 1, at 148-52.
12. See id. at 148 n. 111. The Penn Square liquidation was at the time the largest liquidation in
the history of the FDIC.
13. For the reasons I stated in my article, I do not believe that most uninsured depositors really
count on protection against big bank failures. Sophisticated depositors are aware that the regulators'
choice of solutions, liquidation (which may lead to losses for uninsured depositors), closed bank
merger or open bank assistance (both of which generally result in the protection of all depositors), is
not totally discretionary, but depends on a weighing of the relative cost of each alternative. Id. at
149-50. These depositors recognize that some day a solution that protects all depositors will simply be
impossible or too costly for the regulators to arrange.
14. The conclusion that depositors will choose to rely on their liquidity rather than monitoring
bank risk to protect themselves from losses has led many experts on bank regulation to question
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Moreover, since my article was published, uncertainty about liquidation
risk has increased greatly. Bank regulators have struggled to come up
with new techniques for handling bank failures, but still have not settled
on any predictable policy.' 5 The regulators recently rescued a banking
organization with assets of $12 billion,1" but have denied that they are in
fact committed to rescuing all banks over a certain size.' 7 Thus, uninsured
depositors have no more reason to believe that they are guaranteed protec-
tion in any bank failure than they have to believe that their deposits are
always at risk. This continued uncertainty increases the incentive for de-
positors simply to depend on their ability to run quickly as their best
protection against losses.
III. Effectiveness of Contractual Mechanisms
Proponents of depositor discipline such as Macey and Garrett appear to
recognize these stumbling blocks to effective market discipline, since they
see the need for some incentives to pressure depositors into engaging in
sustained risk analysis. For example, Macey and Garrett suggest that de-
positors could protect themselves from uncertainty before they invest by
obtaining contractual promises from their banks to limit their risk-taking,
like covenants in bond indentures. 8 This suggestion will come as a sur-
prise not only to depositors, but to their banks. Short-term debt, including
both deposits and competitive investments such as commercial paper, is
typically issued without covenants of any sort. Investors do not need to
insist on contractual safeguards because they are protected by the very
short term of their investment. 9 If they become concerned about the is-
whether market discipline can work. See, e.g., Benston, Financial Disclosure and Bank Failure,
FED. RF.SERVE BANK OF ATLANTA ECON. REV. 5, 9 (Mar. 1984); Wall, The Future of Deposit
Insurance: An Analysis of the Insuring Agencies' Proposals, FED. RFSERVE BANK OF ATLANTA
ECON REV. 26, 30-31 (Mar. 1984).
15. Prior to the rescue of Continental Illinois, the regulators briefly experimented with modified
payoffs that subjected uninsured depositors to partial losses. See Garten, supra note 1, at 165 n.190.
Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether the regulators still view the modified payoff as a technique
that could be used in every bank failure.
16. See supra note 3 (First City Bancorporation of Texas). First City had a total of 62 bank
subsidiaries.
17. See Trigaux & Lagesse, Bailout Revives Controversy Over FDIC Role, Am. Banker, Sept. 11,
1987, at 1, col. 4.
18. Macey and Garrett, supra note 5, at 229-30.
19. Liquidity also is provided by the active trading market in short-term debt such as commercial
paper and, to some extent, bank certificates of deposit. In fact, the existence of this secondary trading
market originally made commercial paper a more attractive short-term investment than bank deposits
other than certificates of deposit issued by the largest money center banks. See McKinney, New
Sources of Bank Funds: Certificates of Deposit and Debt Securities, 32 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71,
77 (Winter 1967). Nevertheless, the secondary market in short-term debt can be disrupted by the
failure of a major issuer or other event that causes a run on the market, as illustrated by the effect of
the Penn Central bankruptcy on the commercial paper market in 1970. See W. MELON, INSIDE THE
FED: MAKING MONETARY POt.ICY 157-58 (1985). In these cases, holders of short-term debt can
protect themselves by "running," or simply not renewing their investments at their maturities.
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suer's future inability to repay its debt, they can easily liquidate their
investment and choose an alternative.20
Even if depositors did choose to demand such contractual provisions
prior to investment, it is unclear exactly how such covenants would be
negotiated and enforced. Since it would be impossible for each depositor to
negotiate a separate agreement with the bank, depositors would have to be
represented by the equivalent of an indenture trustee who would monitor
the bank's compliance.2 The bank would have to prepare a disclosure
document similar to a prospectus in connection with each "issue" of de-
posits to disclose the terms of the contract to potential investors.22 Such
procedures would make deposits far more expensive and cumbersome for
the bank and, since these new costs of issuance would be shared with the
investors, for its depositors. Yet it is very unlikely that the additional
safety provided by these debt covenants would justify this increased cost.
The cause of most bank failure continues to be fraud and mismanage-
ment,2" which cannot be prevented by objective covenants. Thus, banks
would rapidly lose funds to competing investments, such as commercial
paper, that provide sufficient safety through liquidity without the inclu-
sion of covenants.
Macey and Garrett also suggest that banks could correct depositors' in-
clination to rely on their liquidity rather than on their assessment of fi-
nancial data to protect themselves from losses by putting restrictions on
depositors' right to withdraw their funds. "4 Apart from the legal difficul-
ties such an action might create for the bank,2 5 limits on the liquidity of
20. Stringent indenture covenants are becoming infrequent even in longer term corporate debt. See
McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. LAW. 413, 424-28 (1986). Moreover,
typical indenture covenants may restrict mergers or the sale of a significant subsidiary (such as the
bank in the case of bank holding company debt), but rarely restrain a firm's "production/investment
policy" or otherwise control day-to-day risk-taking. Efforts to obtain the sort of detailed contractual
provisions suggested by Macey and Garrett, such as a covenant requiring the matching of assets and
liabilities, see Macey & Garrett, supra note 5, at 230, not only would be thoroughly objectionable to
the average bank, but, if adhered to strictly by bank management, would also be very poor banking
policy.
21. It is unclear what the trustee would do to enforce the covenants. If a violation occurred, would
the trustee insist on acceleration of the debt? That may not mean much in the case of fourteen-day
deposits.
22. Deposits are not currently covered by the registration and prospectus requirements of the
Securities Act of 1933, since securities issued by a bank are exempt from registration. See § 3(a)(2),
15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1982). Moreover, deposits are not generally considered to be securities. See
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
23. See J. SINKEY, PROBLEM AND FAILED INSTIrUrIONS IN THE COMMERCIAL BANKING INDUS-
TRY 19 (1979) (noting that major cause of problem and failed institutions has been weak or dishonest
management). See also Doherty, Who's Minding the Fraud?, Am. Banker, Sept. 21, 1987, at 15, col.
1 (fraud is increasingly important factor in recent bank failures).
24. Macey and Garrett, supra note 5, at 231.
25. A bank could only take this action prospectively, since it is very unlikely that a court would
allow the bank to change the terms of outstanding deposits.
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deposits remove the most attractive feature of a deposit as a investment. If
a bank placed significant restrictions on the liquidity of its short-term de-
posits, depositors would not start reading bank disclosure documents, but
would switch their funds to alternative investments, such as deposits in
other banks or even commercial paper, that offer superior liquidity.
Therefore, I do not believe that depositors can be tricked or cajoled into
exerting effective market discipline.26
IV. The Empirical Evidence
My disagreement with Macey and Garrett and other proponents of
market discipline is much deeper than my quarrels with their specific sug-
gestions for improving market discipline. Macey and Garrett assert that
the issue of market discipline is an economic question that "can best be
ascertained through empirical data."27 I do not believe that is the case, nor
does their own evidence bear out this assertion. First, empirical studies of
how depositors actually react to bank risk remain very inconclusive. Al-
though some depositors may demand premiums to invest in certain banks,
the lesson to be derived from this evidence is not entirely clear. Many
studies have found any rate differences to be very short-term.2" Moreover,
fluctuations in rates appear generally linked to bank size: the market will
penalize all large banks, or all regional banks, fairly equally.29 This sug-
gests that depositors may react to adverse news concerning banks gener-
ally, but may not differentiate carefully among banks on an ongoing
basis."0
Moreover, the explanation of rate differentials may be more complex
than differences in individual bank risk. One interesting study of the
spreads between yields on three-month certificates of deposit issued by
26. Macey and Garrett also revive the suggestion that risk-based deposit insurance premiums
would force some discipline on bank management. Macey & Garrett, supra note 5, at 238. Yet previ-
ous proposals for risk-based premiums have been frustrated by the fact, noted by Macey and Garrett,
that bank regulators simply are not as effective as bank management in measuring risk in individual
bank portfolios. The problem is not so much a function of the "regulatory capture" discussed by
Macey and Garrett as that of information asymmetry; the regulators simply will not have access to the
same information as bank management concerning the risk composition of the bank's portfolio. See
Kanatas, Deposit Insurance and the Discount Window: Pricing under Asymmetric Information, 41
J. FIN. 437 (1986). In any case, a risk-based deposit insurance scheme would have to rely primarily
on the bank regulators to determine the optimum levels of risk banks should be taking. Yet this is
exactly what proponents of market discipline are seeking to avoid.
27. Macey & Garrett, supra note 5, at 233.
28. See Chessen, Market Perceptions of Bank Risk, ISSUES IN BANK REG. 3, 12 (Autumn 1985).
29. See Gilbert, Disclosure and Market Discipline: Issues and Evidence, FED. RESERVE BANK
OF AT.ANTA ECON. REV. 70, 71-72 (Nov. 1983) (describing this rate tiering).
30. Recent improvements in bank disclosure may improve depositors' ability to distinguish among
individual banks within size categories, and occasionally banks have been singled out by the market,
notably Continental Illinois following the Penn Square Bank failure. See id. at 72. Nevertheless,
depositors may still find it cost effective simply to use size as a rough measure of financial standing.
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large banks and yields on treasury bills with comparable maturities over a
five year period examined a chronology of events that might have ac-
counted for changes in spreads."1 For example, the rise and successive fall
in the spread between rates on certificates of deposit and treasury bills
between April and August of 1984 coincided with the problems and sub-
sequent rescue of Continental Illinois. But the narrowing spreads in Au-
gust also coincided with a general decline in short-term interest rates."2
Other differences in spreads coincided with economic events such as fluc-
tuating interest rates and the removal of credit restrictions rather than
increases in risk levels at banks."3
Further, reliance on empirical evidence to prove the point that deposi-
tors can exert market discipline on their banks creates a logical inconsis-
tency for proponents of market discipline. If, as these proponents claim,
rescues of failing banks have caused even uninsured depositors to behave
as if their investments are riskless, why are these depositors bothering to
distinguish among banks at all? If such depositors do not feel protected,
why isn't market discipline already effective in controlling bank risk?
This suggests that if depositors do demand different rates from different
banks, they may be motivated by many different factors, ranging from the
secondary market for the bank's deposit instruments 4 and rates offered by
competing investments to concerns about the fate of that particular bank
and the entire banking system. Rates even may reflect sophisticated depos-
itors' fears that bad publicity will cause less sophisticated depositors to flee
the bank, or that the regulators are changing their policies about handling
bank failures. Thus, empirical testing does not occur in a vacuum,' but
must take account of the realities of the deposit market and of
regulation. 35
31. See Chessen, supra note 28, at 4.
32. Id. at 12.
33. Id. at 10. Macey and Garrett suggest that studies of bank stock price movements, including
several I discussed in my article, support the proposition that depositors will exert effective market
discipline. See Macey & Garrett, supra note 5, at 233. These studies, however, deal with sharehold-
ers, not depositors. Even if depositors theoretically can obtain access to the same information about
bank risk that is available to shareholders, that does not demonstrate that depositors will use that
information in the same fashion as shareholders. In fact, the very purpose of my article was to explain
why depositors do not act like shareholders in disciplining their banks.
34. See supra note 19.
35. The point occasionally has been made that market discipline worked reasonably well before
the advent of deposit insurance and regulatory intervention to save failing banks. See Macey & Gar-
rett, supra note 5, at 233 n.73. The problem is that the banking system of the 1980s is very different
from that of the 1880s. In 1888, bank shareholders had more reason to exert their own market disci-
pline than shareholders today, since shares of national and many state-chartered banks were subject to
assessment in the event of the insolvency of the bank. See United States v. Knox, 102 U.S. 422 (1880)
(national bank shareholders). Thus, shareholder discipline may have worked to protect depositors.
Today, proponents of depositor discipline seem to hope that depositor discipline will fill the gap left
by bank shareholders, whose own market discipline has been inadequate to control bank risk.
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Finally, empirical studies have not demonstrated that if depositors are
routinely exposed to losses in the event of bank failure, they will react to
this increased risk by choosing their banks more carefully. Instead, deposi-
tors may simply shorten the maturity of their deposits, or divide their
deposits into insured portions that can be spread among several banks. 6
So long as these efforts produce more safety at less cost than monitoring
information, depositors will continue to find ways to avoid risk. Thus,
simply increasing depositors' exposure to risk will not necessarily force
market discipline upon them. The consequences for other aspects of the
regulatory system, such as deposit insurance coverage, must be taken into
account.
Conclusion
Perhaps these and other aspects of the bank regulatory scheme could be
changed sufficiently to produce the optimum environment for market dis-
cipline. Nevertheless, in the end, that result may not necessarily be desira-
ble for the banking system. Proponents of market discipline see as their
primary goal the need to make the deposit market more efficient. The
present failure of depositors to exert market discipline on banks is said to
create a "moral hazard," since bank management is not constrained by the
market from excessive risk-taking. 7 Theoretically, this constraint should
be supplied by government regulation that is designed to protect the insur-
ance fund against losses. In fact, in the past, critics of the deposit insur-
ance system occasionally have blamed this regulation for causing banks to
take too few rather than too many risks.38 In either case, critics have com-
plained that regulation is an inefficient method of determining how much
risk any particular bank should be taking.
Although this may be the case, the principal goal of the deposit insur-
ance system, including the very significant authority for the regulators to
assist failing banks,39 is not to achieve the efficient number of failures, but
36. Depositors are already doing this through money brokers who package large deposits into
fully insured pieces. See Harless, Brokered Deposits: Issues and Alternatives, FED. RESERVE BANK
OF ATLANTA ECON. REV. 14 (Mar. 1984) Limitations on insurance coverage of brokered deposits
that have been proposed by the regulators from time to time, see Benston, supra note 14, at 9, would
simply cause depositors to find another loophole in the deposit insurance scheme. So long as the cost of
these techniques is less than the cost of monitoring bank risk, depositors inevitably will opt for the
cheapest means of risk avoidance.
37. See E. KANE, THE GATHERING CRISIS IN FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE 14-15 (1985).
38. See Scott & Mayer, Risk and Regulation in Banking: Some Proposals for Federal Deposit
Insurance Reform, 23 STAN. L. REV. 857, 872-73 (1971).
39. The FDIC was first given the authority to facilitate mergers among insured banks in order to
eliminate weak institutions in 1935, only two years after the creation of the federal deposit insurance
system. Although the FDIC may have refined its approach to handling failed banks largely through
administrative action, Congress has implicitly endorsed the FDIC's current policies by broadening the
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to maintain public confidence in the banking system.4 This goal remains
politically important, suggesting that much thought must go into how it
can be reconciled with increased depositor discipline that inevitably will
result in more bank runs and failure. For example, will exposing deposi-
tors to the full fury of bank failure actually cause them to shift their funds
to better managed banks, or will the consequence be a flight of funds from
the banking system? Although the problem of maintaining public confi-
dence in the banking system is rarely mentioned by academics as an im-
portant consideration, it has to affect the regulators when they deal with
the reality of each successive bank failure.
What role then can market discipline realistically play in controlling
bank risk? My own proposal for handling failed banks tried to address
what I see as the greatest practical stumbling blocks to effective depositor
discipline. First, I suggested that the regulators must adopt a consistent
approach to the handling of failed banks in order to reduce the uncer-
tainty that currently surrounds the fate of uninsured depositors."' If de-
positors could predict their risk of loss in the event of failure, they may be
less inclined to react to rumors by joining bank runs.
Second, I suggested that the regulators' choice of banks to be rescued, as
well as the extent of the protection to be guaranteed to uninsured deposi-
tors, should be directly related to the bank's asset value.4 Since asset
value is relatively easy for depositors to monitor, depositors may be per-
suaded to select banks with strong assets in order to increase their chances
of protection in the event of failure. Moreover, depositors would be en-
couraged to prefer those banks that will impose the lowest costs on the
government in the event of failure. This very controlled market discipline
agency's authority to provide novel forms of assistance to keep failing banks open. See Isaac, The Role
of Deposit Insurance in the Emerging Financial Services Industry, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 195, 202-03
(1984) (discussing development of current policies).
40. The goal of maintaining public confidence is based on the need to promote the stability of the
banking system. As has frequently been noted, there has been a remarkable consensus as to the con-
tinuing validity of this goal, as well as the success of the deposit insurance system in achieving it. See
id. at 198 (former FDIC chairman quoting Milton Friedman and John Kenneth Galbraith as to
success of deposit insurance system).
41. Garten, supra note 1, at 166.
42. Id. at 167. As I discussed in more detail in my article, in setting these standards, bank regula-
tors would look not simply to the absolute value of a bank's performing assets, but would develop a
formula that takes into account overall risk composition and profile and loan concentrations. See id. at
168 n.198. These standards obviously are not intended as an absolute proxy for bank risk, but would
provide a way for depositors easily to distinguish between banks that will be liquidated and banks
that will be rescued in the event of failure. Since, as I have previously argued, depositors are already
sensitive to this liquidation risk, especially when a bank run by unsophisticated depositors is immi-
nent, such an asset-based test will at least point depositors in the direction of those banks with rela-
tively solid assets-which are the very banks for which federally assisted mergers are the easiest to
arrange. This is not exactly market discipline as envisioned by its proponents, but it may be a way for
the regulators to reduce the costs of handling bank failures.
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would enable the regulators to explore what in reality the deposit market
can do in responding to bank risk.

